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Abstract
Both industry and rm characteristics inuence the survival of a
rm in an industry over time. Aging, size, structure are factors of-
ten discussed in the literature, but public intervention eects -through
public quality labeling for example - may also have an eect that is
examined here. We use data on French rms producing cheese under
public quality label or not over the period 1990-2006. We perform
a nonparametric estimation using Kaplan-Meier estimators as well as
proportional hazard rate models.
Our results conrm existing ndings on rm survival determinants.
We also shed light on the eect of public intervention into that indus-
try. More precisely, our focus on public quality labeling in the French
cheese industry shows that quality label reduces the risk of exiting
for rms and more particulary for small rms. In other words, public
intervention in this industry is well designed to increase the competi-
tiveness of small rms enabling the coexistence on the market of both
small and large rms.
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11 Introduction
The quality of food products is becoming an important issue for public
authorities. Consumers care about some quality attributes of products and
are willing to pay for them. Consumers increasingly value the quality and
the geographical characteristics of agricultural products (Marette (2005)).
However some of these characteristics are unobservable to them. Then the
quality of such products, called credence goods, cannot be recognized as
such by consumers. In this situation, producers may not have the incen-
tive to produce high quality products (Akerlof (1970)). Public intervention,
though, may enhance social welfare by providing public labels that certi-
es the quality of the product (Auriol and Schilizzi (2003)). In particular,
smaller rms that can nd it too expensive to signal individually the quality
of their products can collectively signal it by sharing the cost of quality sig-
nal through public quality label. For instance, it has been empirically shown
in the case of a specic French cheese industry that rms engaging in such
a label were mostly small size rms (Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban
(2010)).
Some countries have adopted this kind of regulation for many years. For
instance, the AOC (Appellation d'Origine Controll ee) regulation in France
and the DOC (Denominazione di Origine Controllata) in Italy have been
respectively created in 19352 and in 1963. In line with the successive reforms
of the Common Agricultural Policy that tends to eliminate price support
and use non distortional measures that are decoupled from production in
the European Union, the European Commission (EC) has also developed an
EU quality policy. Its objective is to valorize and protect agricultural and
food products through the diversication of agricultural production in order
to 'achieve a better balance between supply and demand on the markets'
(European-Commission (1996)).
High quality reputation is expected to sustain competitiveness and prof-
itability of the agricultural sector. Dierent quality labels have been intro-
duced from 1992 (Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92) for geographical indica-
tions mainly: protected designations of origin (PDO) and Protected Geo-
graphical Indications (PGI). The PDO label certies both a higher product
quality and its geographical origin. Its quality is inherent to a limited geo-
graphical area characterized by geological, agronomic, climatic and historical
factors. It also depends on specic manufacturing process and human fac-
tors requirements. The number of PDO certied products has continuously
increased in the EU and mainly concerns wine, cheese, fruit and vegetable,
butter and oil, and meat.
2AOC recognition follows the creation of the Inao (National Institute for Appellation
of Origin) in 1935 in the wine and liquor sector and has been extended to cheese in 1955.
A specic regulation for Roquefort cheese allowed the creation of the rst AOC cheese in
1925. From 1992, AOC also applies to all agricultural and food products.
2Our goal is to assess the ability of such public policy for quality to sus-
tain the competitiveness of rms involved in such a policy and determine
which rms have beneted from it. From the theoretical literature on PGI,
we know that public label are an ecient tool to provide quality. In a per-
fect competitive market with free entry, Moschini et al. (2008) shows that
an equilibrium exists where PDO producers benet from positive external-
ities linked to the sharing of PDO certication cost, which makes possible
the production of PDO. When producing PDO, producers earn zero prot
and their surplus remains unchanged compared to a generic product in the
case of non-upward slopping supply but is increased if they use specialized
inputs in scare supply. The perfect competitive setting for PDO products
may not always be the adequate market structure to consider given the
specicity of the territory, the input and process requirements required in
the certication regulation. This is at least the case in the average run
where entry adaptation is dicult and even impossible (Hayes et al. (2004)).
Moreover, perfect competition applies when the PDO geographical area is
large enough and when there is no land constraint so that the PDO prod-
ucts do not cover much of the local agricultural production and production
cannot be controlled. For instance, Chambolle and Giraud-H eraud (2003)
developed a framework with an exogenous production restriction for PDO,
based on the French AOC wine example where the production is adapted
to the geographical territory with a limitation of yield per hectare and a
control of restrictive processing technology requirements. Certication im-
plies technological requirements that are most of the time not fullled above
a production threshold (cf. Giraud-Heraud et al. (2003)). One might thus
consider the protability of PDO in a context of non competitive markets
where production is somehow controlled and where this supply control may
enhance the development of geographical indication market (cf. Marette
and Crespi (2003) and Lence et al. (2007)).
More generally, production can be controlled through dierent ways: the
access control to the use of some specic ingredients or process, the choice
of a selected area that takes into account the specicity of the region, the
limitation of the membership in the producer group, the compliance to strict
quality production standard (Hayes et al. (2004)). In this case, if the quality
label meets the consumer needs, the innovation in production and market-
ing developed by the operators for labeled products may lead to a successful
activity for those operators.
The role of certication cost also plays a determining role in the protability
of PDO production. Without (or low) certication cost, producers may have
the incentives to produce the high quality. However, if this cost is high, then
this incentive is reduced and producers may opt to produce the low quality
(generic product). The collusion on quantity can then be a tool to overcome
this quality provision concern. Actually, when certication costs are high,
collusion allows for individual prots that may compensate for the PDO cer-
3tication cost and for the cost generated by the PDO technical requirements,
so that the PDO emergence is more likely to occur in a monopoly structure
than in a perfect competition one, the intermediate structures leading to
intermediate likelihood (Lence et al. (2007)).
While the theoretical literature on the protability of public quality label
is extensive, empirical ndings are scarce. This paper tries to ll this gap
by analyzing how PDO-like label can contribute to the success of rms that
voluntary enter into such a quality certication scheme. To accomplish this,
we provide an empirical analysis of the French AOC label, which is older
than its EU equivalent PDO. In 2010, the AOC labeled products included
49 dairy products and 40 other foodstus (among which 13 AOC for fruits
and vegetables, 13 for olive and olive oil and 6 for meat) in addition to the
394 wine and liquor appellations.3
The performance of dairy rms is measured through their life duration on
the market or "survival". It is one of the most widely used empirical measure
of performance (Foster et al. (2008)). Firm survival has been shown to be
strongly related to other performance measures as protability and growth
and gives a better understanding on industrial strategies (cf. Dunne et al.
(1988)). It is used to analyze how AOC quality label has contributed to
the development of dairy rms and to the current structure of the dairy
industry.
We use two data sets that cover the period 1990-2006 and provide infor-
mation on the characteristics of rms and products in the dairy sector. The
rst one is an annual rm survey that cover rm-level data while the second
one is an exhaustive survey of all dairy plants that provides information on
individual production at a detailed level of product category. Such informa-
tion which is quite dicult to obtain at the individual level enables us to
distinguish among AOC and non AOC plants. We use it for the rst time to
assess the impact of AOC on rm performance. Because cheese represents
all but one dairy product under AOC, we focus on AOC cheese and analyze
the role of AOC on the dynamics of the French cheese sector.
The article is organized as follows. The next section review the deter-
minants of rm survival. Section 3 provides an overview of the data set
and discusses its strengths and weaknesses for measuring rm survival rate.
Section 4 presents the methodology used to estimate survival rate and Sec-
tion 5 provides the main estimation ndings. The nal section discusses
conclusions and implications for future research.
2 Determinants of Firm Survival
The relation between performance and survival has been empirically
shown. Measure of performance through total factor productivity aects
3A specic European regulation applies for PDO wine.
4survival (Bellone et al. (2006) and Foster et al. (2008)). Lower performance
is observed some years before their failure (Kiyota and Takizawa (2006)).
Dierent factors may explain survival. Actually, various "stylized facts"
have been drawn from the empirical literature on rm survival, entry and
exit. These facts apply in many countries and for many industrial sectors
(Geroski (1995) and Caves (1998)). Both industry and rm characteristics
inuences rms' duration length. Substantial rates of entry and exit is re-
currently found in a number of countries. In this section, the main ndings
are summarized. We use these ndings to construct the empirical strategy
when testing the determinants of cheese rm dynamics.
Table 1 summarizes the determinant of rm survival found in the lit-
erature. The age of rms is an important feature of rm survival. New
rms face high risk of failure during the rst years of their existence (new-
ness). Their capacity to survive depends on their ability to gather market
information and to modify their strategy to the post-entry environment.
Firm mortality then declines over time. The oldest rms may suer from
erosion of technology and products (obsolescence) over time so that their
failure rate may be high (aging). However, they may also benet from
strong trademarks that help them increase their longevity. Firm size is also
a major determinant of survival (smallness). This factor is relevant both
for new and older rms but its impact is stronger on the dynamics of new
rm. According to Aldrich and Auster (1986), dierent factors may explain
this fact. First, small-sized rms may have more diculty to raise capital.
Second, tax law can be more detrimental compared to larger rms. Third,
public regulation aects more smaller rms. In addition, large rms may be
favored in the competition on the labor market. Considering that the failure
rate is increasing with the size of irretrievable outlay needed to move from
minimal or fringe entry to optimal-scale operation, the size of irretrievable
outlays also acts of the survival of rms. It results that small rms may have
a higher failure rate as they will nd it more dicult to reach the minimum
eciency size at which they will be able to operate. Another explanation of
the size impact on survival is related to the costs of labor and capital. If they
are high, this could be detrimental to new/small rms that will have more
diculty to develop their activities and favor older/larger rms. In addition
to age and size, the structure of the rm may also aect rms' dynamic. As
shown by Disney et al. (2003), when an establishment is part of a group,
it increases its survival rate relative to a single establishment. This result
supports the idea that establishments that are part of a group can learn
from other establishments of the group and get better market information
compared to single establishments.
The dynamics of rms also depend on the characteristics of the indus-
try under consideration. Comparison between dierent industries in dier-
ent countries reveals common industry determinants for survival patterns.
Both entry and concentration depend on the sunkness of incumbents' com-
5Table 1: Determinants of rm survival






Capital and labor cost -/+
Establishment part of a group +
Productivity +
Industry characteristics
Barrier to entry -/+
Innovativeness -/+
Early stage in life cycle -/+
Agglomeration and technological spillover +
mitment and more generally on trade barriers, which has an incidence on
survival length. Trade barriers in an industry can arise from high minimum
eciency scale (MES), capital intensity, advanced technology or product
dierentiation and innovation. On the one hand, a high MES implies rela-
tive large amount of resources that are needed to reach the MES. If rms
cannot achieve this level of resources, they may not be able to survive on
the market. On the other hand, rms that have entered the market will
be less sensitive to exit when they have incurred large sunked resources. A
high level of innovative activity in an industry may make entry more risky
and increase failure risk (Jensen et al. (2008)). However the reverse could
be also true if there is a self selection process of rms before entry decision.
Moreover, it may exist some knowledge spillovers for rms that are close
to innovative rms. Agglomeration or regional advantages may compensate
negative eects of higher costs and competition from other rms located in
the the same area. Falck (2007) and Fritsch et al. (2006) empirically show
the importance of these regional eect on survival. The distribution of in-
novations between new and incumbent rms changes over the industry life
cycle. These changes aect the probability of survival for rms (Agarwal and
Gort (2002)). Lower survival rate occurs at the early phase of life cycle when
innovation is high and entry risky while higher survival occurs in the later
phase when the market is mature and competitiveness increased as innova-
tion and technical change rate are limited. When the phase of obsolescence
of initial endowments is reached, the failure rate increases again.
Our analysis focus on a specic industry, the French cheese industry.
6We analyze the impact on rm dynamics of the most relevant factors iden-
tied above, age, size, MES and single establishment rm. In this specic
industry, we will study the impact of some form of innovation through pub-
lic labeling (AOC). When adopted by rms, AOC may incur higher costs
linked to quality requirement and certication costs on the one hand but
they can benet from the higher quality signaled to consumers and increase
their competitiveness on the other hand. We asses the impact on AOC label
on survival on the relative importance of these factors.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use rm and plant surveys covering the period 1990-2006 provided by
the French Administrative Direction of Statistics (INSEE). The rst main
set information reports economic and administrative information at the rm
level (EAE) while the second set is reporting production, activities and more
detailed information on the industrial process at the plant level for dairy
rms (EAL). 4 The rst set is available only for rms with more than 20
employees, while the second set is exhaustive at the France level.
The proportion of AOC in the total production of cheese amounts to
around 17%. We focus in this study on AOC cheese made from cow (30
AOC) and sheep milk (3 AOC) which represents 97% of milk used in the
processing of AOC cheese.5 Each observation gives us information on rms
that might be constituted of dierent plants.
The survival analysis is performed on the 1430 rms observed during
the period 1990-2006, for which we were able to identify if the rm was
producing cheese with AOC label or not. We have information on all rms
(of more than 20 employees) involved in cheese production. Among those
485 rms observed on the period, cheese production may or not be the main
activity of the rm. When rms have other activities, cheese is most often
the main one. Other activities include dairy products other than cheese.
We also consider as rms individual plants that are reported in EAL and
that are not linked with rms present in the EAE baseline. These rms, for
which accounting data are not available are reported as small rms of less
than 20 employees. We choose to do the analysis at the rm level rather
than at the plant level. An analysis at the rm level is more relevant as
AOC like strategy is decided at the rm level and not at the plant level.
Moreover, it enables us to take into account rm characteristics that may
4EAE stands for Enqu^ ete Annuelle d'Entreprise while EAL is the Enqu^ ete Annuelle
Laiti ere, both provided by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques.)
5Data from EAL do not allow the identication of AOC cheese from goat milk. AOC
cheese from goat milk have been mainly developed from the nineties and concerns 13 AOC
cheeses.
7inuence rm survival as its number of plants or its product mix.6 Entry
and exit data thus correspond to the creation and destruction of rms and
rms are considered to be active as long as at least one of its plant is active
(i.e. produces cheese).
We are able to compute the time spells corresponding to the survival of
the surveyed rms using the previously described data sets. By construction
these time spells are evaluated as intervals measured in years over the period
1990-2006. Indeed, our data indicate that a rm was present in the sample
during a given year. But, when a rm disappeared in the following year, the
exact time (day or week) the exit has occurred is not known. In this case
the transition times are said to be grouped and discrete-time hazard models
are used to deal with such data. Thus the minimum value of a time spell
is one year, and its maximum value is 17. As in Disney et al. (2003), we
consider that a rm exit in a given year t if it is observed in year t and if it
was already present in year t   1 but absent in year t + 1 and we consider
that a rm enter if it were absent in year t 1 but present in year t+1. Some
rms may be absent both in t   1 and in t + 1. They are considered as one
year only entrant. Finally, stayers are rms that are observed to be active
in t and that are neither an entrant, an exitor nor a one year observed rm.
Then, the number of rms observed a given year is equal to the sum of the
number of entrants, exitors and stayers minus the number of one-year-only
rms. All the previous denitions are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Denition of entry and exit
t-1 t t+1
Exitors Observed Observed Non-observed
Entrants Non-observed Observed Observed
One-year-only Non-observed Observed Non-observed
Stayers Observed Observed Observed
The pattern of entry and exit is summarized in Table 3. Compared to
other studies, the cheese sector in France exhibits a lower rate of turnover
with only 8% of rms being on the market a given year exit the market
while only 5% enter, meaning that the French cheese sector became more
concentrated with time. It results that the number of rms on the market
decreases in time. From 1990 to 2006, the number of rms have decreased
by 40% from 924 to 559. Entry and exit rates in the French cheese sector are
in the range of values found in the literature for manufacturing industries.
For instance, Caves (1998) reports a study comparing entry and exit rates in
several countries and found entry rates varying from 3 to 13% and exit rates
from 5 to 13%. These values are higher in the study of Disney et al. (2003)
6We have also performed the survival analysis at the plant level excluding the variable
linked to rm (product mix, number of plants) and similar results were found.
8that found an entry rate of 18.5% and exit rate of 16.5% in the food, drink
and tobacco sector in U.K. on the period 1986-1991. Similarly, Fritsch et al.
(2006) nd that the survival rate after two years for start-ups in the food
sector is around 72%.7 In addition, reported entry and exit rates in these
articles suggest that the food sector are among the industries showing the
lowest entry and exit rates. Another feature is that entry and exit rates are
both relatively low, which is consistent with the facts reported in Geroski
(1995) (stylized fact 3) that states that net entry rates and penetration are
modest fractions of gross entry rates and penetration. Moreover, the net
exit rate is quite low (3%), which suggests that the French cheese sector is
in a rather mature stage of its lifecycle (Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) and
Jensen et al. (2008)).
Table 3: Number of rms: Stayers, Entrants and Exitors
Year All Stayers Entrants Exitors One-Year
N % N % N % N %
1990 924 795 86 % 58 6 % 71 8 % 0 0 %
1991 872 771 88 % 21 2 % 85 10 % 5 1 %
1992 809 725 90 % 25 3 % 64 8 % 5 1 %
1993 783 685 87 % 39 5 % 62 8 % 3 0 %
1994 753 621 82 % 32 4 % 102 14 % 2 0 %
1995 707 589 83 % 63 9 % 59 8 % 4 1 %
1996 674 610 91 % 25 4 % 41 6 % 2 0 %
1997 653 518 79 % 21 3 % 117 18 % 3 0 %
1998 642 518 81 % 99 15 % 28 4 % 3 0 %
1999 652 573 88 % 38 6 % 41 6 % 0 0 %
2000 643 569 88 % 34 5 % 43 7 % 3 0 %
2001 614 577 94 % 13 2 % 24 4 % 0 0 %
2002 607 562 93 % 17 3 % 28 5 % 0 0 %
2003 596 546 92 % 15 3 % 36 6 % 1 0 %
2004 585 528 90 % 24 4 % 38 6 % 5 1 %
2005 570 519 91 % 21 4 % 32 6 % 2 0 %
Mean 693 607 87.6% 34 5 % 54 8% 2 0.3 %
Now consider the covariates that can aect the survival of the dairy
rms. In Tables 4 and 6, we dene several variables of prime interest for the
analysis performed here. These variables include the main determinants of
rm survival found in the literature.
7The study of Disney et al. (2003) analyzes the pattern of industries using plant data
and the one of Fritsch et al. (2006) considers only very small rms. These features may
explain why they nd higher values. The smaller the production unit, the higher the
turnover will be.
9Table 4: Time-Constant Variable description
Variable name Unit Description
Year [1990   2006] current year
Survival # survival of the rm (in years)
AOC dummy = 1 if Firm is producing AOC cheese
Multi dummy = 1 if rm with multi-plants , 0 if single
Old dummy = 1 if rm created before 1990
IMES dummy = 1 if rm's production above the Minimum Eciency
Scale of its specic Cheese industry
IGroup dummy = 1 if rm has been aliated to another rm,
0 if independent
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on the variable created and useful
for the rst step of the survival analysis presented below. These variables
are time-constant variables. We consider that the rm is producing an AOC
cheese whenever at least one of its plant produces an AOC cheese during the
whole period. Half of the observed rms have produced AOC at least one
year. Multi is a dummy variable indicating that the rm had more than
one plant during the whole period. This variable can be viewed as a proxy
of the size of the rm as 90% of single rms employless than 51 employees,
while 50% of the multi-plant rms employ more than 39 people (the median
for single rms being 20).8 The sample is mainly composed of single plant
rms (78%). Old indicates whether the rm was present or not before the
beginning of the period under scrutiny. IMES indicates whether a rm
has reached or not the minimum eciency scale dened as the median rm
production by category of cheese during the whole period.9 Finally, IGroup
denotes that a rm has been a subsidiary rm.
Table 6 describes the time-varying variables we use in the second step of
the survival analysis. These variables were previously used in order to build
some of the rms time-constant features presented above. Table 7 presents
some summary statistics of those variables.
4 Empirical Methodology
By the denition or the period covered by the surveys (1990-2006), three
dierent time spells can be observed:
8In our dataset, more precisely in the EAL survey, we cannot recover the exact number
of employees for rms with less than 20 employees.
9The repartition of rms according to cheese production category shows that on third
of them devotes their main production to hard cheese, 22% to semi hard cheese and 18%
to soft cheese, the remaining rms producing blue cheese, processed cheese, fresh cheese
and other cheese.
10Table 5: Time-Constant Summary Statistics
variable mean sd min max N
Survival 8.12 5.51 1.00 17.00 1430.00
AOC 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1430.00
Multi 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 1430.00
IMES 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1430.00
Old 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1430.00
Table 6: Denition of time-varying variables
Variable Denition
AOCsharet Share of AOC production relative to the total cheese
production of the rm in year t
MESt = 1 if Firm's production is above the Minimum Eciency
Scale of its specic Cheese industry in year t
Groupt = 1 if Firm has been aliated to another rm in year t
Table 7: Summary Statistics of time-varying variables
variable mean sd min max
AOCshare 0.69 0.86 0.00 16.00
MES 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Group 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
111. complete time spell when a rm enters the sample before 1990, and
exits before 2006,
2. right-censored time spell when a rm enters after 1990, and is still
alive in 2006, and
3. left-truncated time spell when a rm entered before 1990, and exits
before 2006 or is still alive in 2006.
We can identify this latter type of time spell because the surveys in-
dicate if a rm was active or not before 1990. But, for most of the rms
that were active before this year, we do not know when they have been
created. Fortunately, left truncation will not aect the maximum likelihood
estimators presented below. Indeed, it can be easily shown that the correct
contribution under delayed entry is simply obtained by letting the rm start
contributing observations after entering the study in 1990 and discarding the
periods preceding 1990.
The starting point of modeling the survival of rms using the previously
dened time spells, is then to dene the discrete-time hazard function as the
probability of exit at discrete time t, given that it has not yet occurred, i.e.
ht = Pr[T = tjT  t] (1)
The discrete-time survivor function, i.e. the probability that duration before
exit exceeds t, can then be obtained recursively from the hazard function
(1) as




(1   ht) (2)
Given the denition of the discrete-time hazard function in (1), a natural





where dt is the number of non censored time spells ending at time t, and nt
is the number of rms at risk at time tj. More precisely, when time spells
can only be right censored, the number of rms at risk at time t equals the
number of rms that were alive at time t 1 minus the number of rms that
exit at this time, their time spells being censored or not. Left truncation
refers to rms which do not come under observation until they are at risk.
By the time you begin observation of such rms, they have already survived
for some time, and you observe them only because they did not exit during
that time. Thus, when such rms become at risk, nt is simply increased
12by adding their number to reect this fact. The Kaplan-Meier estimator














This is a decreasing step function with jump at each discrete time t. The
Kaplan-Meier estimator can be shown to be the nonparametric maximum
likelihood estimator of the survivor function (Kalbeisch and Prentice, 2002).
Discrete-time hazard estimations can also be obtained as predicted prob-
abilities using a logistic regression model where the covariates are dummy
variables for each year, i.e.
logit(Prob[yi;s = 1j di;s]) = 1 + 2d2;i;s + ::: + JdJ;i;s (5)
Here, yi;s is an indicator for the exit occurring at time s for rm i, d2;i;s, ...,
dJ;i;s are dummy variables for years 2, ..., J, J referring to the last time
period observed for any rm in the sample, and di;s = (d1;i;s;:::;dJ;i;s)0 is a
vector containing all the dummy variables for rm i. The constant term 1
and the t, t = 2;:::;J, are parameters to be estimated. Indeed, the logistic
model (5) can be interpreted as a linear model for the logit transformation
of the discrete-time hazard, or
logit(Prob[yi;s = 1j di;s]) = logit(Prob[Ti = sj Ti  s; di;s])
= logit(hi;s) (6)
No functional form is imposed on the relationship between discrete-time
hazard and year because dummy variables are used for year 2, ..., J, the
intercept 1 representing year 1. Moreover, it can be shown that the ob-
tained estimates of discrete-time hazards constitute the discrete limit of the
better known Kaplan-Meier nonparametric estimate of continuous-time haz-
ard rate (Kaplan and Meier (1958)), as time becomes more nely discretized.
Although it can be interesting to investigate how the population average
or marginal hazard evolves over time, the main purpose of survival analysis
is usually to estimate the eects of covariates on the hazard. This can be
done by tting a logistic discrete-time hazards model including covariates,
i.e.
logit(Prob[yi;s = 1j di;s; xi;s]) = 1 + 2d2;i;s + ::: + JdJ;i;s + 0 xi;s (7)
where xi;s denotes a vector of time-constant and time-varying covariates.
Model (7) with only time-constant variables is sometimes referred to as
13the continuation-ratio logit model or sequential logit model. In this model,
parameter estimates possess a direct interpretation in terms of odds ratio.
Thus, for a given variable k, the odds ratio is estimated as exp(b k), implying
that the odds of exiting in any given year (given that exit has not already
occurred) increase (or decrease) by (exp(b k)   1)  100%.
In the following, when assessing the eects of time-varying covariates on
rm survival, we will use the complementary log-log transformation instead
of the logit transformation because this transformation function holds if a
proportional hazards model holds in continuous time and the survival times
are interval censored (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal (2002) for a proof). The complementary log-log discrete time
hazards model is dened as
cloglog(hi;s)  lnf ln(1   hi;s)g
= 1d1;i;s + 2d2;i;s + ::: + JdJ;i;s + 0 xi;s (8)
The parameters  in equation (8) are the same regression parameters that
are contained in the scale factor of the underlying continuous-time propor-
tional hazards model, i.e. the function (x;) = exp(0x) in the factorized
expression of the continuous-time hazard function h(jx) = h0()(x;).
Similarly, the time-specic constants t can be written as function of the
baseline hazard function, i.e. h0(). By estimating these parameters freely
for each time-point, no assumption is done regarding the shape of this base-
line hazard function within the time intervals.
5 Results
Before setting up the multivariate analysis, we rst evaluate the eect
of each variable described in Table 4 separately using the nonparametric
Kaplan-Meier estimator of survival function. Log-rank tests are then used
to determine if the survival functions vary between the dierent groups of
dairy rms dened by the modalities of these variables.
Figure 1a displays the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function
without any covariates. In the following gures 1(b-d) we report the esti-
mated survival curves and their respective 95% condence intervals, allowing
the investigation of the inuence of four of the variables identied in the lit-
erature as having an impact on rm survival (see section 2). Figure 1b
present a clear-cut dierence between the survival of single and multi plants
rms. The variable Multi capturing a size eect, this means that larger
rms are faced with a lower probability of exit whatever the duration. It
is notable that the survivor curve of larger rms is less steep compared to
the survivor curve of small rms. We observe less clear-cut results when
considering the impact of group aliation or eciency scale (see Figure 1c
and 1d). The aliation to a group (resp. exceeding the minimum eciency
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scale) signicantly increases the survival of rms. We observe the same pat-
tern for the age eect for the some values of the time spell, however the
eect is more fuzzy (Figure 1e).
Statistical tests can be used to substantiate the validity of the previ-
ously observed dierences of the survivor curves. We use the family of tests
proposed by Harrington and Fleming (1982). These tests are designed to
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test the null hypothesis that two survival curves that have been estimated
by the Kaplan-Meier estimator are equal to each other. The particular ver-
sion we apply is the log-rank test which is more sensitive to later dierences
between survival curves. The test outcomes (values of the statistics and
their p-values) are given in Table 8. They show that the aforementioned
dierences between the survivor curves are not only visually apparent but
also statistically signicant. Thus multi plants, group aliation, eciency
scale and age are important factors that lower the risk of exit at any time.
These results are consistent with the main ndings of the literature on rm
survival discussed in section 2.
One feature of the French cheese industry is the existence of public label-
ing policy through AOC. We use the same methodology to asses the impact
of AOC on rm survival. Figure 2a reports the estimated survival curves for
two cohorts of rms, producing or not AOC labeled cheese. The two curves
display slightly diverging patterns, AOC rms having a lower probability of
exit than non AOC rms. The log-rank test (Table 8) conrms that this
dierence is signicant. A closer investigation of this eect is provided in
16Table 8: Log-rank tests






AOC- Single plant 47.55 0.0000
AOC- Multiple plant 0.03 0.8606
Figures 2b and 2c where we distinguish rms according to their size mea-
sured by the Multi variable.10 We nd a large and statistically signicant
eect of AOC labeling when considering small rms while this eect does
not show up for large rms (see Table 8).
The Kaplan-Meier estimates of rm survival have the advantage to pro-
vide a good descriptive analysis of survival without specifying any functional
form for the survival pattern and highlight the dierences between cohorts
of rms (AOC, age, type...). However, the Kaplan-Meier approach is lim-
ited when survival is investigated on sub-cohorts of rms and the eect of
variables on the hazard of rms becomes hazardous. In order to overcome
this problem and give more structure to the estimation, we now investi-
gate the eects of covariates on the hazard in the multivariate framework
presented in section 3. Table 9 presents the results of the estimation of a
logistic discrete-time hazards model including the time-constant covariates
described in Table 4. Results from the logistic regression strengthens the
results from the Kaplan-Meier estimation. The coecients of the variables
AOC, Multi, IMES and Old have all the expected signs and are all signi-
cantly dierent from 0. In addition, the logistic estimates show that when a
rm becomes multi-plant (become larger), its probability of failure decreases
by 74%. The impact of AOC is also signicative: a rm that engages in AOC
production decreases its hazard probability by 40%. The production scale
of the rm also plays a role but in a lower extent. If its size becomes equal
or larger to the minimum eciency scale, it reduces its hazard probability
by 25%. For a rm created before 1990, the failure probability increases by
33% compared to a younger rm (created after 1990).
To assess the impact of AOC on survival by rm type, we estimate the
model proposed above but we include an additional dummy (MultiAOC)
that captures the cross eect of the variable Multi and AOC. Table 10
presents the results of the estimation. They show that if the rm is small
10We cross the AOC factor with other factors (age, type), without nding any signicant
eect.
17Table 9: Logistic estimation of discrete-time hazard model
variable Coef Std. Err. [ 95 % Conf. Interval ]
year==2 0.152 0.142 -0.127 0.431
year==3 0.179 0.146 -0.109 0.466
year==4 0.051 0.157 -0.256 0.358
year==5 0.700*** 0.142 0.423 0.978
year==6 0.194 0.165 -0.130 0.519
year==7 -0.053 0.184 -0.414 0.308
year==8 0.914*** 0.153 0.615 1.214
year==9 -0.358 0.238 -0.824 0.109
year==10 -0.213 0.243 -0.690 0.264
year==11 0.121 0.227 -0.323 0.565
year==12 -0.468 0.293 -1.043 0.106
year==13 -0.147 0.272 -0.681 0.386
year==14 -0.274 0.295 -0.852 0.305
year==15 -0.042 0.280 -0.592 0.507
year==16 0.090 0.274 -0.448 0.627
AOC -0.511*** 0.074 -0.657 -0.366
Multi -1.335*** 0.115 -1.560 -1.110
IMES -0.354*** 0.075 -0.501 -0.206
Old 0.284*** 0.082 0.123 0.446
Constant -2.099*** 0.118 -2.331 -1.868
18Table 10: Logistic estimation of discrete-time hazard model with cross eects
variable Coef Std. Err. [ 95 % Conf. Interval ]
year==2 0.153 0.143 -0.126 0.433
year==3 0.181 0.147 -0.106 0.468
year==4 0.054 0.157 -0.253 0.361
year==5 0.707*** 0.142 0.429 0.985
year==6 0.202 0.166 -0.123 0.526
year==7 -0.046 0.184 -0.407 0.316
year==8 0.924*** 0.153 0.624 1.224
year==9 -0.346 0.238 -0.813 0.120
year==10 -0.199 0.244 -0.677 0.278
year==11 0.137 0.227 -0.307 0.581
year==12 -0.449 0.293 -1.024 0.126
year==13 -0.128 0.272 -0.661 0.406
year==14 -0.257 0.295 -0.835 0.322
year==15 -0.027 0.281 -0.576 0.523
year==16 0.105 0.275 -0.433 0.644
AOC -0.592*** 0.080 -0.748 -0.436
Multi -1.627*** 0.162 -1.944 -1.310
IMES -0.353*** 0.075 -0.500 -0.205
Old 0.302*** 0.083 0.140 0.464
MultiAOC 0.629** 0.220 0.197 1.060
Constant -2.079*** 0.118 -2.310 -1.847
(unique plant), then engaging in AOC production increases its survival prob-
ability while if it is larger (multi-plants), the impact is very small, indicating
that AOC production has no impact on larger rms.
19Finally we estimate a complementary log-log model incorporating time-
varying covariates (AOCshare;MES;Group and the cross variable AOCshare
Multi). This model is consistent with an underlying continuous time hazard
proportional model. The results provided in Table 11 conrm the signi-
cant eect of AOC, IMES and IGroup when taking their time-varying
equivalents.
Table 11: Complementary log-log model
variable Coef Std. Err. [ 95 % Conf. Interval ]
year==2 0.135 0.135 -0.130 0.400
year==3 0.153 0.139 -0.119 0.425
year==4 0.029 0.149 -0.263 0.321
year==5 0.621*** 0.132 0.361 0.880
year==6 0.157 0.157 -0.151 0.464
year==7 -0.106 0.177 -0.452 0.240
year==8 0.790*** 0.142 0.512 1.069
year==9 -0.409 0.231 -0.861 0.042
year==10 -0.279 0.235 -0.740 0.182
year==11 0.039 0.217 -0.386 0.464
year==12 -0.539 0.285 -1.099 0.020
year==13 -0.236 0.263 -0.751 0.279
year==14 -0.358 0.286 -0.918 0.203
year==15 -0.147 0.270 -0.676 0.382
year==16 -0.022 0.263 -0.537 0.494
AOCshare -0.363*** 0.059 -0.479 -0.246
Multi -1.411*** 0.139 -1.682 -1.139
MES -0.218** 0.075 -0.366 -0.071
Group -0.224 0.130 -0.478 0.031
Old 0.238** 0.078 0.086 0.391
AOCShareMulti 0.333** 0.113 0.112 0.554
Constant -2.219*** 0.112 -2.438 -2.000
6 Concluding remarks
To sum up, on one side our results conrm existing ndings on rm
survival determinants. On the other side, we contribute to this literature
and shed light on the eect of public intervention into an industry. More
precisely, we focus on public quality labeling in the French cheese industry
and show that quality label reduces the risk of exiting for rms and more
particularly for small rms. In other words, public intervention in this indus-
try is well designed to increase the competitiveness of small rms enabling
20the coexistence on the market of both small and large rms. This result
is in line with Sutton's prediction (Sutton (1991)). Sutton (1991) predicts
that in endogenous sunk cost industries (strategic choice of advertising and
R & D expenditures), concentration remains bounded away from zero as
market size increases and that concentration increases when price competi-
tion becomes tougher. However, if substitutability is low, then in spite of
the eectiveness of R&D, concentration may also be low. If PDO enables
small rms to reduce the substitutability of their products to those of larger
rms, PDO can then act as a dierentiation tool in the market where small
niche rms are able to survive thanks to a reduced price competition. This
generates a lower hazard rate for this rms that it would be without the
implementation of the quality label. We can then presume that without the
label policy, the market would be more concentrated.
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